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The political consequences of the 
product cycle: industrial history 
and political outcomes 
James R. Kurth 
The public policies of major industries: the contemporary conflict 
What explains the continuing stagnation in the industrial economies of 
the West? What will be the impact of such stagnation upon domestic politics 
and upon international relations? Are there domestic and foreign policies 
which the state can undertake to bring about a return to sustained economic 
prosperity and a recapitulation of that lost golden age of 1948-1973? These are 
now the central questions for scholars in the emerging field of international 
political economy. A recent special issue of International Organization, edited 
by Peter Katzenstein, has presented some of the most useful and sophisticated 
approaches to these questions and analyses of the international political 
economy of the West during the period of the last thirty years. 1 
These questions are, of course, also the central ones for major economic 
actors such as industrial corporations and financial institutions. And here we 
can distinguish five different answers or solutions to the problem of economic 
The preparation of this article was facilitated by a year spent at the Institute for Advanced 
Study, Princeton, New Jersey, and by discussions there with Albert Hirschman. I have also 
benefited from comments by Thomas Ferguson, Peter Gourevitch, and Martin Shefter. 
1 Peter J. Katzenstein, editor, Between Power and Plenty: Foreign Economic Policies of 
Advanced Industrial States, a special issue of International Organization 31, 4 (Autumn 1977). A 
systematic and perceptive review of recent literature on one theme of the new international 
political economy, the impact of international economics upon domestic politics, is given in Peter 
Gourevitch, "The Second Image Reversed: The International Sources of Domestic Politics," 
International Organization 32, 4 (Autumn 1978). 
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2 International Organization 
stagnation. Each is preferred and supported by a particular cluster of in-
dustries or banks, and each has particular implications for domestic and 
foreign policies. 
The most minimal solution to economic stagnation, in the sense that it 
requires the least change from government policies of recent years, is the con-
ventional Keynesian one of government-induced demand-creation. This ap-
proach is preferred by the consumer-durables industries, the most important 
of which is the automobile industry. A familiar variation is government spend-
ing on weapons procurement and government support of weapons exports; 
this approach of mutant or military Keynesianism is preferred by the aero-
space industry. The two variations on a Keynesian theme, supported by the 
two leading industries of the long prosperity of 1948-1973 which contributed 
so much to the acceptance of Keynes' ideas, in turn favor the continuation of 
the existing system of international free trade. Unfortunately, however, these 
two Keynesian approaches to economic stagnation are so minimal that they are 
already perceived by other economic sectors as inadequate for their needs. 
A third approach requires greater change from past priorities: systematic 
restraint or reduction of industrial wages and welfare benefits, in order to 
increase the rate of profit and thus the amount of capital available for reinvest-
ment in industry to make it more competitive in the world market. This 
approach, once known as deflation and now often associated with the ideas of 
Milton Friedman, is preferred by the large commercial banks heavily engaged 
in international operations. And, of course, this approach also favors the con-
tinuation of the existing system of international free trade. 
The fourth approa,ch would be rather more radical: it would displace the 
system of international free trade with one of "organized free trade," i.e., 
international cartels, or even with one of vigorous protection of national 
industries with tariffs and quotas against imports. This, its advocates claim, 
would permit sufficient capital formation to make the protected industries 
efficient once again. This approach, which has been called neomercantilism, is 
of course the one preferred by the oldest industries, in particular the textile, 
steel, and chemical industries of Europe and America. 
The above four solutions focus on preservation of existing industries. A 
fifth, rather different approach is possible, which focuses on the creation of 
new industries or indeed new leading sectors whose rapid growth would lift up 
the entire economy behind them, much as the automobile industry did in 
America in the 1920s and in Europe in the 1950s-1960s. And since the nation 
which introduces a new industry has a natural advantage in the world market 
for a decade or even for a generation, industrial innovation would also ·favor 
the continuation of the system of international free trade. This approach 
draws upon that other great economist of the 1930s, Joseph Schumpeter, who 
saw the advantages of "gales of creative destruction," i.e. depressions, which 
pruned the economy of overinvestment in old industries and cleared the way 
for investment in new ones, but whose ideas were eclipsed by Keynes' during 
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The political consequences of the product cycle 3 
the long prosperity of 1948-1973. 2 By its nature, its advocates would be found 
among new, growing industries, such as telecommunications, rather than 
mature, established ones, and among investment banks, rather than com-
mercial ones. 
The politics of the next few years, then, will involve the conflict between 
these alternative solutions to economic stagnation and the conflict between the 
different industries that support them. But it will not be the first time that 
politics in major industrial countries have been shaped by the public policies of 
major industries and by the conflicts between them. 
This essay seeks to add a historical dimension to the analysis of the 
political impact of different industries. It examines the political tendencies of 
three successive leading sectors in Europe and America over the last two 
centuries-textiles, steel, and automobiles. Each of these has been the largest 
industry for several major industrial nations in the West at one time or 
another. Of course, there have been other industries which have also formed 
major economic sectors in particular countries at particular times, for ex-
ample, the chemical and electrical industries in Germany, which we will also 
discuss, and the aerospace industry in the United States. Nevertheless, from 
the overall perspective of comparative economic history, the textile, steel, and 
automobile industries assume an especially prominent place. 
Each of these three industries has gone through what could be seen as a 
life cycle of growth, stagnation or saturation, and decline in the major coun-
tries of Europe and in the United States. The process has been similar to one 
which Raymond Vernon has analyzed in his studies of contemporary transna-
tional enterprises and which he has termed the product cycle. 3 In Vernon's 
concept the product cycle consists of four phases: 
1. Innovation of a product and growth of its sales in the domestic 
market. 
2. Saturation of the domestic market and export of the product to 
foreign markets. Exports will go first to those countries whose de-
mand structures (e.g., national income per capita) are most similar to 
that in the home country. When these markets in turn are saturated, 
the export drive will move on to countries whose demand structures 
are less similar. 
3. Manufacture of the product within foreign markets, i.e., direct for-
eign investment. Again, investment will go first to those countries 
2 Joseph A. Schumpeter, Business Cycles: A Theoretical, Historical, and Statistical Analysis of 
the Capitalist Process, two volumes (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1939). 
• Raymond Vernon, Sovereignty at Bay: The Multinational Spread of U.S. Enterprises (New 
York: Basic Books, 1971). An earlier formulation of the idea of certain patterns or cycles in the 
development of industries can be found in Walther G. Hoffmann, The Growth of Industrial 
Economies, translated by W. 0. Henderson and W. H. Chaloner (Manchester: Manchester 
University Press, 1958). 
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4 International Organization 
whose supply structures (e.g., factors of production) and demand 
structures are most similar to those in the home country and later to 
countries whose supply structures are less similar. Within the home 
country, the manufacture of the product reaches a plateau. 
4. Export of the product from foreign countries into the original home 
market. Eventually, indeed, there will be export of the product from 
the latest foreign countries to manufacture it into not only the original 
home market but also into other foreign countries which had once 
been the latest manufacturers. Within the home country and these 
other earlier producers, the manufacture of the product goes into 
decline. 
These four phases describe very well the life cycle of the automobile in-
dustry in the United States and in the countries in Western Europe. But the life 
cycles of the textile industry and the steel industry have also been variations on 
the same theme. The textile and steel industries rarely engaged in direct foreign 
investment in manufacturing, phase 3, but each passed through the other three 
phases. And in the steel industry there was the functional equivalent of phase 3 
with indirect foreign investment, the financing of the foreign railroads which 
were the major final consumer of the home steel industry. In addition, as we 
shall see, the steel industry passed through its own peculiar phase, that of 
government procurement of its products for military purposes. 
In his own work, Vernon has not extensively examined the consequences 
of the product cycle for major political outcomes. However, Robert Gilpin, in 
a major, pathbreaking book, has drawn on the concept of the product cycle, 
expanded it into the concept of the growth and decline of entire national 
economies, and analyzed the relations between this economic cycle, national 
power, and international politics. 4 
In this essay, we will pursue these themes of Vernon and Gilpin by ex-
amining some of the political consequences of the industrial life cycles of tex-
tiles, steel, and automobiles over the last two centuries. In general, the major 
consequences of the domestic growth phase of an industry have been for 
domestic politics, including the nature of political regimes. Conversely, the 
major consequences of the later phases, those of foreign exports and foreign 
investments, have been for foreign policies. For the textile industry and the 
steel industry, our focus will be on the major countries of Europe; for the 
automobile industry, we will widen our focus to include the United States. 
Of course, many of the political outcomes that we will discuss have been 
enormously complex in their causes and can hardly be adequately explained by 
industrial factors alone. The rise of the liberal state in the nineteenth century, 
the "new imperialism" of the 1870s-1890s, the Anglo-German naval race 
• Robert Gilpin, U.S. Power and the Multinational Corporation: The Political Economy of 
Foreign Direct Investment (New York: Basic Books, 1975). 
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The political consequences of the product cycle 5 
before World War I, the coming to power of Hitler in 1933, and the political 
stability of Western democracies in the thirty years after World War II-these 
momentous events have each been the subject of an enormous and sophisti-
cated historical literature, rich in an array of competing explanations, and 
many readers will disagree with the particular interpretation offered here. We 
make no claim that our analysis provides a full explanation and understanding 
of these historical phenomena. It is our suggestion, however, that the in-
dustrial factor has a consistency over time and a commonality over space that 
gives it a special value as an explanatory approach. 
The political tendency of the textile industry 
The domestic growth phase 
In almost all countries, the first stage in industrialization has been the 
creation of a textile industry. This has required the mobilization of relatively 
modest amounts of capital, modest, that is, in relation to the amount of 
capital already available in the country as a result of pre-industrial enterprises 
and also modest in relation to the amount of capital that has been needed for 
the creation of later industries, such as steel, railroads, chemicals, automo-
biles, and aerospace. Consequently, the textile industries of Europe (and also 
of the United States and the most advanced countries of Latin America) were 
created for the most part by family firms, and the industries grew through the 
reinvestment of their earnings. In contrast with later industries, the capital ac-
cumulation for textile industrialization could be accomplished largely without 
dependence upon financing from banks, the state, or foreign investors. 5 
The lack of dependence upon financing from banks had important conse-
quences for the development of financial institutions. The financial agencies 
that grew up around the textile industry were clearing houses and commercial 
banks engaged in short-term credits to merchants. They were not investment 
houses and industrial banks engaged in long-term credits to industry. Those 
banks that did engage in long-term credits at the time did so with loans to 
governments, not to industries. 
• E. J. Hobsbawm, The Age of Revolution: Europe 1789-1848 (London: Weidenfeld and 
Nicolson, 1962); also the country studies in Carlo M. Cipolla, editor, The Emergence of Industrial 
Societies (London: Collins, Fortana Books, 1973). Statistics on the growth of the textile industry 
in European countries can be found in B. R. Mitchell, European Historical Statistics, 1750-1970 
(New York: Columbia University Press, 1976), pp. 427-436; and in Cipolla, op. cit., pp. 780-788. 
Three useful overall accounts of European industrialization, from contrasting perspectives, are 
David S. Landes, The Unbound Prometheus: Technological Change and Industrial Development 
in Western Europe from 1750 to the Present (-Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1969); 
Tom Kemp, Industrialization in Nineteenth Century Europe (London: Longman, 1969); and 
W. W. Rostow, The Stages of Economic Growth (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1960; 
second edition, 1971), elaborated in his The World Economy: History and Prospect (Austin: 
University of Texas Press, 1978). In his works, Rostow develops and employs at length the con-
cepts of the leading sector. 
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6 Intemational Organization 
The lack of dependence of the textile industry upon financing from the 
state also had important consequences for the development of political institu-
tions. The capital accumulation for textile industrialization could be ac-
complished largely without state intervention, except for the elimination of 
barriers to a free market within the national boundaries (e.g., internal tariffs) 
and for the erection of external tariffs on occasion for the protection of the 
"infant industry." Textile manufacturers did not want the dynastic-authori-
tarian state of the past, and they did not need the technocratic-authoritarian 
state of the future. Rather, the textile manufacturers in Europe in the first half 
of the nineteenth century were opposed to many of the traditional activities of 
the state. They did not want the internal tariffs, the consumer taxes, and the 
tedious regulations of the absolutist monarchies, which prevented the 
manufacturers from selling their goods in a nationwide market. And they did 
not want the local guild monopolies and local welfare systems, which also 
prevented them from drawing their labor from a nationwide market. 6 Simi-
larly, the commercial banks wanted an end to restrictions on the free move-
ment of capital. To systematically eliminate the traditional impediments to 
free movement of goods, labor, and capital, however, the textile manufac-
turers and commercial bankers needed institutionalized representation at the 
national center of power. To achieve this they needed ''the supremacy of 
parliament," ideally within "the liberal state." But the textile manufacturers 
did not need the assistance of the state to mobilize large amounts of investment 
capital; nor did they yet need its assistance to demobilize large numbers of 
socialist workers, services that would later be performed by such diverse 
authoritarian governments as those of Napoleon III in France, Bismarck in 
Germany, Mussolini in Italy, and Primo de Rivera and Franco in Spain. 
The liberal state, with parliamentary supremacy and with property suf-
frage, was the most finely-tuned solution to the problems of the textile in-
dustry (and of other industries producing light consumer goods such as shoes) 
and of commercial banking. The liberal state gave them the abolition of 
traditional barriers to trade; parliamentary supremacy meant that they would 
be represented at the center of national power; and property suffrage meant 
that only they and the traditional elites would be so represented. As such, there 
was, in the familiar phrase of Max Weber (and of Goethe before him), an 
"elective affinity" between the textile industry, commercial banking, and such 
a regime. The political theory of the coalition between the textile industry and 
commercial banking was summed up by Thomas Macaulay in 1830: 
Our rulers will best promote the improvement of the nation by confining 
themselves strictly to their legitimate duties, by leaving capital to find its 
most lucrative course, commodities their fair price, industry and in-
telligence their national reward, idleness and folly their natural punish-
• Frederick B. Artz, Reaction and Revolution, 1814-1832 (New York: Harper and Row, 1963), 
chapters I-III; Hobsbawm, op. cit., chapter 2. 
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The political consequences of the product cycle 7 
ment, by maintaining peace, by defending property, by diminishing the 
price of law, and by observing strict economy in every department of the 
state. Let the government do this, the people will do the rest. 7 
We should not overemphasize the actual consequences of this elective 
affinity between textiles and liberals, however, for in Europe the political im-
pact of the textile industry varied from one country to another according to 
when the country industrialized and to how the industry fit into the interna-
tional market. 
The British model 
The connection between textile industrialization and the liberal institu-
tions was most obvious in the first industrializer, Britain, which in the early 
nineteenth century was simultaneously "the workshop of the world," "the 
mother of parliaments,'' and the center of ''Manchester liberalism.' ' 8 The tex-
tile industry also had a major political impact in the second wave of 
industrializers, that is, France, Belgium, and Switzerland, each of which ex-
perienced rapid growth in the industry in the 1820s. The textile manufacturers 
were a major force in the Revolutions of 1830 in each of these three countries 
(as they were in the related conflict over the Great Reform Bill in Britain in 
1830-1832). And they were a major force in the establishment arid support of 
the succeeding liberal regimes: the Orleanist Monarchy in France (the "Bour-
geois Monarchy" or monarchie censitaire), the new and similar monarchy in 
now-independent Belgium, and the new regimes in the most industrialized 
cantons of Switzerland. 9 
In Britain, France, and Belgium prior to textile industrialization, the old 
absolutist monarchy had been displaced and the landed aristocracy had been 
diminished in power by revolutionary upheavals at one time or another. This 
meant that the textile industry could grow up in a relatively open political 
space, at least compared with the countries to the East and the South, and that 
it was easier for it to achieve its political aims. 
In addition, the textile industries in the early industrializers were relatively 
competitive in the international market. This was most obviously true of Bri-
tain, "the workshop of the world," but even France, Belgium, and Switzer-
land were successful in selected international textile markets. This meant that 
for textile manufacturers in these countries, there was no conflict between the 
economic and the political parts of liberalism, between free trade and civil 
liberties. Again, this made it easier for the textile industry to develop a 
7 Quoted in Frederick B. Artz, op. cit., pp. 85-86. 
• E. J. Hobsbawm, Industry and Empire: The Making of Modern Society, Vol. JI, 1759 to the 
Present Day (New York: Pantheon, 1968), chapters 3-4; William Langer, Political and Social 
Upheaval, 1832-1852 (New York: Harper and Row, 1969), chapters II-III. 
• Langer, op. cit., chapters III-IV; Artz, op. cit., chapters VIII, IX; B. M. Biucchi, "The 
Industrial Revolution in Switzerland,'' in Cipolla, op. cit., pp. 627-652. 
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8 International Organization 
coherent vision and then to develop, in Gramsci's sense, an ideological hege-
mony. The most dramatic example was the dominance of the doctrine of Man-
chester liberalism in Britain. 
The Prussian mutation 
The political impact of the textile industry was very different in the next 
or third wave of industrializers, Prussia and Austria, which experienced rapid 
growth in the industry only in the 1840s-1850s. Here, the Napoleonic Wars 
had displaced neither the old landed aristocracy nor its ally, the absolutist 
monarchy. Accordingly, the textile industry grew up in a relatively closed 
political space, cramped and contained by a well-entrenched agrarian upper 
class. 10 
One consequence was that textile industrialization in the East 
(1840s-1850s) was somewhat delayed from when it might have occurred and 
later than that in the West (1820s-1830s, even earlier in Britain). Yet, certain 
social groups in the East, in particular, students, professors, and lawyers, im-
ported liberal ideas from the West during the Napoleonic Wars and the Res-
toration. The result was that a gap opened up between liberalism and in-
dustrialization. In the East in the 1810s-1830s, liberalism was a movement 
without much of a social base-what William Langer has called "the 
liberalism of the intellectuals" rather than the liberalism of the 
manufacturers. 11 At this point liberalism outpaced industrialization. 
A second, later consequence was that when textile industrialization did 
occur, the textile manufacturers would not be strong enough relative to the 
agrarian upper classes to impose their political vision on the rest of society. 
The new "infant industry" in the East was highly vulnerable in its domestic 
markets to competition from the older established textile manufacturers in the 
West, and accordingly the Eastern manufacturers were highly protectionist in 
regard to international trade policies. These features of the textile industry in 
the East diminished its liberal impulse and impact. The 1840s to the 1860s were 
the high point of liberal movements in the history of the Hohenzollern and 
Habsburg monarchies, yet liberal institutions never achieved the strength that 
they had in the West. At this point the gap between liberalism and in-
dustrialization continued but was reversed: industrialization outpaced 
liberalization. 
Indeed, from the 1820s to the 1860s, the political economies of Britain 
and Prussia were almost mirror images. British textiles were competitive in the 
international market, while British grain was not. Conversely, Prussian grain 
was competitive in the international market, while Prussian textiles were not. 
10 On industrialization in Prussia and Austria, see Knut Borchandt, "The Industrial Revolution 
in Germany 1700-1914" and N. T. Gross, "The Industrial Revolution in the Habsburg 
Monarchy 1750-1914," in Cipolla, op. cit., pp. 76-156, 228-276. 
11 Langer, op. cit., chapter IV. 
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The political consequences of the product cycle 9 
Thus British textile manufacturers favored both free trade and liberal institu-
tions, and British grain producers favored neither. Prussian textile manufac-
turers favored liberal institutions but not free trade, and Prussian grain 
producers favored free trade but not liberal institutions. The fact that British 
textile manufacturers could impose free trade upon British grain producers 
(the abolition of the Corn Laws in 1846) reinforced the social power of 
political liberals. Conversely, the fact that Junker grain exporters could im-
pose free trade upon Prussian textile manufacturers (the low-tariff policy of 
the Zollverein) reinforced the social power of political conservatives. In Bri-
tain, economic liberalism worked to reinforce political liberalism; in Prussia, 
economic liberalism worked to undermine it. 12 
The Latin pattern 
The political impact of the textile industry was very different again in the 
next or fourth wave of industrializers (Italy, Spain, and Portugal). Here, tex-
tile industrialization was delayed for a generation after that of Germany and 
Austria, two generations after that of France, Belgium, and Switzerland, and 
more than three generations after that of Britain. The countries of Latin 
Europe are thus the first severe case of "underdevelopment" or "dependent" 
industrialization. 13 
But like the East, the South also imported liberal ideas from the West dur-
ing the Napoleonic Wars and the Restoration. Indeed, the first use of the term 
"Liberal" for a political group was in Spain in 1810, in the Constituent Cortes 
at Cadiz. Unlike the East, however, the social base of liberalism in the South 
also included military officers and bureaucratic officials, primarily because the 
old legitimate monarchies at the apex of the military and bureaucratic 
organizations had been displaced during the Napoleonic invasions. With such 
a social base, Southern liberalism was stronger than Eastern liberalism, whose 
social base was confined to intellectuals, but weaker than Western liberalism, 
whose social base included textile manufacturers. However, the absence of a 
new cohesive industrial class, the absence of the old cohesive agrarian class, 
and absence of the old legitimate monarchy combined to mean that for Latin 
Europe this was a period when no social group could exercise political author-
ity, a period of military coups, popular revolts, and civil wars. 
When textile industrialization did occur, the textile manufacturers could 
grow up in rough coequality with the agrarian upper classes. And this by the 
mid-1870s eventually issued in political stability and a special kind of liberal 
state, one based on a policy of tariff protection for both textiles and 
12 The economic basis of the contrast between Britain and Prussia is one theme discussed in 
Barrington Moore, Jr., Social Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy: Lord and Peasant in the 
Making of the Modern World (Boston: Beacon Press, 1966). 
13 On industrialization in Italy and Spain, see Luciano Cafagna, "The Industrial Revolution in 
Italy 1830-1914" and Jordi Nadal, "The Failure of the Industrial Revolution in Spain 
1830-1914," in Cipolla, op. cit., pp. 279-325, 532-620. 
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10 International Organization 
agriculture, a marriage of cloth and wheat comparable to the contemporary 
''marriage of iron and rye'' in Bismarck's Germany. 14 
The foreign export phase 
The British textile industry was the first to move into the second phase, 
the domestic stagnation phase, of the industrial life cycle. When the British 
textile industry reached the saturation point in its British markets and "the 
falling rate of profit," its natural, because minimal, response was to simply 
continue its old activity in a new place, i.e. it shifted from the selling of textiles 
in Britain to the selling of textiles in Europe. By the end of the Napoleonic 
Wars, 50-70 percent of British textile production each year was sold abroad. 
This was the motor behind the British foreign policy of free trade. 
As the European market in turn became saturated, the textile in-
dustry shifted to the selling of textiles in Latin America. Here was the motor 
behind the British support of, and occasional intervention in, the 
Latin-American Wars of Independence. This combination of free trade and 
gunboat diplomacy would later be termed by John Gallagher and Ronald 
Robinson ''the imperialism of free trade.'' 15 It probably reached its apogee in 
the Opium War of 1842, near the end of the severe depression of 1837-1843. 16 
The transnational enterprise of this era of free trade was the trading company, 
the largest being the East India Company. The foreign policy of the British 
textile industry was summed up, again by Thomas Macaulay, in 1833: 
It would be, on the most selfish view of the case, far better for us that the 
people of India were well-governed and independent of us, than 
ill-governed and subject to us; that they were ruled by their own kings, 
but wearing our broadcloth, and working with our cutlery, than that they 
were performing their salaams to English collectors and English magis-
trates, but were too ignorant to value, or too poor to buy, English 
manufactures. To trade with civilized men is infinitely more profitable 
than to govern savages. 17 
The success of British textiles in the international market led to the rein-
forcement of the British banking system of clearing houses, commercial 
14 On Italian politics during the nineteenth century, see Arthur James Whyte, The Evolution of 
Modern Italy (New York: W. W. Norton, 1%5); and Denis Mack Smith, Italy: A Modern 
History, revised edition (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1969). On Spanish politics, see 
Gerald Brenan, The Spanish Labyrinth: An Account of the Social and Political Background of the 
Civil War (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1950); and Joan Connolly Ullman, The 
Tragic Week: A Study of Anticlericalism in Spain, 1875-1912 (Cambridge, Massachusetts: 
Harvard University Press, 1%8). 
1• John Gallagher and Ronald Robinson, "The Imperialism of Free Trade," in George H. 
Nadel anc;I Perry Curtis, editors, Imperialism and Colonialism (New York: Macmillan, 1964). 
1• E. J. Hobsbawm, Industry and Empire, chapter 7. 
17 Quoted in Michael Edwardes, The Last Years of British India (Cleveland: World Publishing, 
1963), p. 234. 
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The political consequences of the product cycle 11 
banks, short-term credits, and now to insurance companies and to the expan-
sion of its operations into the world arena. This kind of banking system, with 
its peculiar combination of short-term time horizons and worldwide space 
horizons, would have important implications for British domestic and foreign 
policies in later years. 
There was another possible response to the saturation of domestic 
markets, however. That was to shift investment capital into a new industry, in 
this case the iron and steel industry and the railroads. This British investors did 
in the 1840s, and the result was the British boom of the 1850s. This choice be-
tween response one and response two, between foreign expansion and 
technological innovation, between producing an old commodity for a new 
country and producing a new commodity for the old country, was a crucial 
one. And the same crucial choice reappears as each new leading sector reaches 
its eventual and inevitable maturity and decline. 
The textile industries of the other major European countries reached the 
saturation points of their own domestic markets at various times during the 
last three decades of the nineteenth century. The normal response of each 
country was to search for new markets in underdeveloped countries, par-
ticularly in a nation's colonial territories where the products of the national 
textile industry had a natural or even legal (e.g., tariffs) advantage over the 
products of foreign competitors. This drive for new colonial markets was one 
of the causes of "the new imperialism" of the late nineteenth century, in-
cluding "the scramble for Africa" in the 1880s. But the textile industry by 
itself does not explain much about colonial policy. A more powerful engine 
propelling the new imperialism was the domestic stagnation phase of the steel 
industries of Europe. 
The political tendency of the steel industry 
The domestic growth phase 
The second stage in the industrialization of a country normally has been 
the creation of a steel industry and the related creation of those industries 
which are the final consumers of steel-railroads, shipbuilding, and, in the 
twentieth century, automobiles. 
The creation of a country's steel industry and its crucial consumer in the 
nineteenth century, the railroads, required the mobilization of far larger 
amounts of capital than that required in the creation of the textile industry. 
This distinction between the capital required for textile industrialization and 
that required for steel and railroad industrialization is one aspect of the 
distinction that Alexander Gerschenkron drew between early industrialization 
and late industrialization. 18 Gerschenkron argued that in the late in-
18 Alexander Gerschenkron, Economic Backwardness in Historical Perspective (Cambridge, 
Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1962). 
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dustrializers the need to mobilize large amounts of capital led to the need for 
financing by large investment banks or even by the state. This in turn led the 
investment banks to organize industrial cartels to prevent competition between 
the recipients of their investments. The complex of cartelized industry and in-
dustrial banks then was well-positioned to shape state policies. Or when the 
state itself undertook the financing of industrialization, it led to authoritarian 
measures. In Gerschenkron's view it was no accident that the late in-
dustrializers, in particular Germany, Austria-Hungary, Italy, and Russia were 
or eventually became authoritarian states. Guillermo O'Donnell has reached 
similar conclusions in analyzing Latin-American countries. O'Donnell argued 
that in these still later industrializers the move from the consumer-goods stage 
of industrialization into the capital-goods stage of industrialization generates 
severe balance of payments problems, the need to mobilize large amounts of 
capital, and again the turning of economic and technocratic elites to the solu-
tion of the "bureaucratic-authoritarian" regime, as in Brazil in 1964 and in 
Argentina in 1966. 19 
The actual evidence for the causal connection between the steel industry 
and authoritarian politics is rather mixed. In the first industrializer, Britain, 
the mobilization of capital for the second stage of industrialization occurred 
without any dramatic change in financial institutions or in state intervention. 
Indeed, the mobilization of capital for the British iron and steel industry and 
for the British railroads was achieved about as easily and as incrementally as 
the mobilization of capital for the British textile industry. But in Britain the 
ease of capital mobilization for iron, steel, and railroads was itself a conse-
quence of the prior overwhelming success of British textiles in foreign markets, 
which generated large profits and large amounts of capital for investment in 
new enterprises. From the 1820s to the 1850s, textile exports normally formed 
40-60 percent of Britain's exports each year. 20 
In France, the pattern was somewhat different. After a slow growth of the 
iron industry and of railroads before 1848, France experienced rapid growth in 
these sectors in the 1850s and 1860s. It is an oft-told tale that this rapid growth 
required new financial institutions, such as investment banks (e.g., the Credit 
Mobilier of the Pereire brothers); in turn, these new investment banks, it is 
said, needed the support of a strong state (i.e., the Second Empire of Na-
poleon III, 1852-1870) to break the power of the traditional banks. 21 Indeed, a 
1• Guillermo A. O'Donnell, Modernization and Bureaucratic-Authoritarianism: Studies in 
South American Politics (Berkeley: International Studies, University of California, Berkeley, 
Politics of Modernization Series No. 9, 1973). 
20 Hobsbawm, Industry and Empire, chapters 6 and 7. A useful overall account of the growth 
and impact of the European iron and steel industries and railroads is Hobsbawm's The Age of 
Capital, 1848-1875 (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1975). 
11 See, for example, Gerschenkron, op. cit., and Rondo E. Cameron, France and the Economic 
Development of Europe, 1800-1914, Conquests of Peace and Seeds of War (Princeton: Princeton 
University Press, 1961), chapter IV. 
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good case can be made that the first in the endless parade of modern bureau-
cratic-authoritarian regimes was the French Second Empire. 
The Third Republic, which replaced the Second Empire after its defeat in 
the Franco-Prussian War in 1870, was not an authoritarian regime. Yet in the 
1880s it organized and supported, through the Freycinet Plan, another major 
expansion of the French steel industry and the French railroads. 22 This casts 
doubt on the argument that steel and railroad industrialization in France re-
quired an authoritarian regime. On the other hand, just as in Britain in the 
first half of the nineteenth century, so too in France in the 1880s, the export of 
textiles provided the capital to finance the expansion in iron, steel, and rail-
roads. During this period, textile exports normally formed 30-50 percent of 
France's exports each year. In Britain, the expansion was financed by British 
domination of the international markets for low-price cotton goods; in 
France, the expansion was financed by French domination of the international 
market for high-quality goods, especially woolen ones. It was France's special 
vocation in the quality products of the last stage of the pre-industrial era 
which eased its transition through the second stage of the industrial 
revolution-and made it easier to do without the discipline of another 
authoritarian regime. 23 
In Germany, the path to steel and railroad industrialization was very dif-
ferent from that in either Britain or France. At the time Prussia and then Ger-
many undertook this second stage of industrialization, it had achieved no 
dominance of the world market for any product of the first stage, that of tex-
tiles. Accordingly, there was an absence of large profits from foreign trade and 
thus of large amounts of capital to be invested in steel and railroads. There was 
therefore a need for new kinds of financial institutions, specifically industrial 
investment banks or state enterprises. 24 And there was also a relatively open 
space in the German financial system within which these new institutions grew 
and indeed reached a dominant position. As in Britain where the weakness of 
the agrarian elites had permitted the textile industry and commercial banking 
to grow up unconfined and to eventually dominate the political system, so too 
in Germany the weakness of the textile industry and commercial banking 
(itself due to the strength of the agrarian elites, the Junkers) permitted the steel 
industry and industrial banking to grow up unconfined and eventually to 
dominate. 
By the end of the long prosperity of 1850-1873, sometimes known as the 
22 Sanford Elwitt, The Making of the Third Republic: Class and Politics in France, 1868-1884 
(Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1975), introduction and chapter I. 
2• William Woodruff, "The Emergence of an International Economy, 1700-1914," in Cipolla, 
op. cit., pp. 673-674. 
2• See, for example, Gerschenkron, op. cit., and Cameron, op. cit., chapter IV. A useful and 
detailed discussion of the relationships between economics and politics in Germany under Bis-
marck is presented by Fritz Stern, Gold and Iron: Bismarck, Bleichroder, and the Building of the 
German Empire (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1977). 
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great railroad boom, Britain and Germany had each institutionalized the 
respective methods by which they had passed through the first and second 
stages of industrialization. Britain represented the overdevelopment of the 
first stage of the industrial revolution, composed of the textile industry and 
commercial banking. Germany represented the overdevelopment of the second 
stage of the industrial revolution, composed of the steel industry and industrial 
banking. Even more, however, Germany represented the overdevelopment of 
the coalition between the last stage of the pre-industrial era, that of commer-
cialized agriculture, and the second stage of the industrial one-what was to 
become in 1879 the famous "marriage of iron and rye." France took a middle 
position between the two, having a political economy more balanced between 
the agricultural, the textile, and steel sectors, between domestic and foreign 
markets, and between commercial and investment banking. 
In Britain, France, and Germany, the iron and steel industry and the rail-
roads developed together, as a sort of "steel-rail complex." In Italy and 
Spain, however, this nexus was severed. The major railroads of Latin Europe 
were built with rails and rolling stock imported from Britain and France and 
were financed with capital loaned by British and French investment banks. 25 
The result was railroadization without steel industrialization. Since the capital 
mobilization for the railroads of Latin Europe came from foreign investors 
rather than from the national government, from abroad rather than from 
above, no dramatic reorganization of the state was necessary. It is not sur-
prising, therefore, that the construction of the railroads of Italy and Spain in 
the mid- and late-nineteenth century could coexist with the conservation of 
their liberal institutions and parliamentary systems. 
Italy did construct a substantial steel industry in the 1900s, however. 
(Spain would not do so until after World War II.) But, as in Britain and in 
France in earlier times, the necessary capital mobilization in Italy was made 
possible by the export of textiles. In Italy's case, it was Italian domination of 
the international market for high-quality silk products. It was also another 
case where the second stage of the industrial revolution was financed by the 
achievements of the last stage of the pre-industrial era. 26 
Most later steel industrializers, such as Spain, Brazil, and Argentina, 
lacked the capability to dominate the international market for a particular in-
dustrial product. This led them into severe balance of payments difficulties 
(even though they were exporters of agricultural products), once they tried to 
move from the stage of textile or "import-substitution" industrialization to 
the stage of steel or capital-goods industrialization. The conjunction of the 
need to mobilize large amounts of capital and severe balance of payments 
deficits leading to devaluations and severe inflation created an influential con-
stituency among economic, bureaucratic, and technocratic elites in support of 
2 ' Cameron, op. cit., W. 0. Henderson, Britain and Industrial Europe: 1750-1870: Studies in 
British Influence on the Industrial Revolution in Western Europe, third edition (London: Leicester 
University Press, 1972). 
2• Cafagna, op. cit., pp. 289-290, 302-325. 
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an authoritarian regime. In contrast with a liberal, parliamentary system, an 
authoritarian regime was better able to destroy labor unions, repress wages 
and consumer demand, and thus squeeze capital out of the working class in 
order to finance the new capital-goods sector. 
The foreign export phase and the naval procurement phase: 
from the Great Depression of 1873-1896 to World War I 
The most pronounced impact of the steel industry upon political out-
comes came, not in its phase of domestic growth, but in its phase of domestic 
stagnation, that is, after steel production reached saturation in its home 
markets, and the industry turned to foreign ones. And because the responses 
of Britain to this phase in the nineteenth century can be seen as prototypes of 
many American industrial policies in the mid-twentieth century, we shall 
discuss the British experience at some length. 27 
Britain 
The British iron industry (it would not become a steel industry proper un-
til the adoption of the Bessemer process in the 1860s) and the associated rail-
roads fueled the British boom of 1851 to 1857. A brief depression from 1857 to 
1859 led the British to push for a series of international treaties to promote free 
trade, such as the Cobden-Chevalier treaty of 1860 between Britain and 
France. The 1860s were relatively prosperous. During this period some banks 
of the City of London began the large-scale financing through bonds of rail-
roads on the Continent, many of them built with British rails and British 
equipment. 28 
By the beginning of the 1870s, however, railroad-building in Britain had 
reached the saturation point, and to a lesser degree the same was true of Brit-
ain's railroad-building on the Continent. An economic historian (who later 
went on to other things) once asked "What happened when the railroads were 
built?"29 His answer was "the Great Depression of 1873-1896." Although 
other factors also contributed to the long economic depl'.ession after 1873, such 
as the entry into the world markets of massive amounts of cheap grain from 
the American midwest, which sharply drove down European grain prices, the 
peaking of railroad-building in Europe was certainly a central factor. 30 
27 See the comparison between Britain and America drawn by Robert Gilpin, op. cit. 
2• W. O. Henderson, op. cit. 
2• W. W. Rostow, British Economy in the 19th Century (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 1948), p. 88. (Rostow originally developed his argument in 1938.) 
•• The connections between the end of railroad expansion and the beginning of the Great 
Depression are also discussed in Hobsbawm, Industry and Empire. An excellent comparative 
analysis of the politics of the Great Depression is Peter Alexis Gourevitch, "International Trade, 
Domestic Coalitions, and Liberty: Comparative Responses to the Crisis of 1873-1896," The 
Journal of Inter-Disciplinary History, VIII (Autumn, 1977): 281-313. An earlier classic account is 
Hans Rosenberg, "Political and Social Consequences of the Great Depression of 1873-1896 in 
Central Europe," Economic History Review, XIII (1943): 58-73. 
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What was the response of the British steel industry and of the bond-deal-
ing banks of the City of London to the saturation of their former markets and 
more generally to the Great Depression? Again, the first response was simply 
to continue their old activity in a new place, i.e., they shifted the building and 
financing of railroads from Britain and the Continent to the "regions of recent 
settlement" (i.e., the United States, Canada, Australia, and Argentina) and to 
the regions on the borders of Europe (e.g., Turkey and Egypt). In some of the 
latter regions, however, the inability of weak and corrupt governments to meet 
their bond payments led Britain in the 1870s and 1880s into interventions and 
even annexations. Thus began the first steps toward "the new imperialism." 
Of course, the factors making for "the new imperialism" were many, and 
historians have developed a variety of explanations, such as strategic calcula-
tion, bureaucratic activities, and popular moods. The industrial and financial 
factor, however, seems to have been an especially consistent and common 
one. 31 
The change that took place in the minds of some industrialists, after the 
beginning of the depression in 1873, was registered by William Menelaus, a 
leading steel manufacturer, in his presidential address to the British Iron and 
Steel Institute in 1875: 
We have but little demand from Europe, and we seem to have lost our 
American market entirely .... We must, I think, frankly accept the posi-
tion in which we are placed, and prepare to seek new markets for our pro-
duce in countries which, even if they have the will, have not yet the power 
to impose restrictions on our trade. 32 
In their new foreign policy, the steel industry had allies, of course, in the 
textile industry, who were also suffering from the depression and who were 
already familiar with the advantages of ''the imperialism of free trade.'' 
However, even the new overseas receptacles of British textiles and steel 
soon reached the saturation point or at least the law of diminishing returns. 
The result was a new, sharp business downturn, the depression of 1883, within 
the overall Great Depression of 1873-1896. Again, the minimal response was 
to expand the old activities into new countries, reinfbrcing "the new im-
perialism" and "the scramble for Africa" of the 1880s. 
E. J. Hobsbawm summarizes this crucial choice of Britain in response to 
the Great Depression: 
She was too deeply committed to the technology and business organiza-
tion of the first phase of industrialization, which had served her so well, 
to advance enthusiastically into the new and revolutionary technology and 
3 ' Various aspects of imperialism are analyzed in Roger Owen and Bob Sutcliffe, editors, 
Studies in the Theory of Imperialism (London: Longman, 1972). 
32 Quoted in J. C. Carr and W. Taplin, History of the British Steel Industry (Cambridge, 
Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1962), p. 39. 
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industrial management .... This left her with only one major way out-
a traditional one for Britain, though one also now adopted by compet-
ing powers-the economic (and increasingly the political) conquest of 
hitherto unexploited areas of the world. In other words, imperialism. 33 
The choice was in part the result of the British banking system. The 
absence of strong investment and industrial banks meant that it was especially 
difficult for Britain to mobilize capital for long-term equity investment in new 
technologies and industries. 
The second response of the British steel industry to the Great Depression 
and in particular to the depression of 1883 was the building of steamships. 34 
Just as the railroads brought cheap grain and meat from the hinterlands to the 
ports of the regions of recent settlement, so the steamships brought them from 
these ports to Britain. But these receptacles, or rather vessels, of British steel, 
also soon reached the saturation point. The result was another sharp business 
downturn, the depression of 1893, within the overall Great Depression. 
The third response of the British steel industry to the Great Depression, in 
particular to the depressions of 1883 and 1893, was again a minimal move. 
Having built commercial ships, it was natural enough that the next step was to 
build naval ships. The beginning of the depression of 1883 was followed by the 
"navy scare" of 1884 and by a 20 percent increase in the British naval budget 
in 1885, the largest increase since the Crimean War. The beginning of the 
depression of 1893 was followed by another navy scare of 1893-1894 and by 
another 20 percent increase in the British naval budget in 1894, regularized in 
the Spencer naval program of 1894 which laid plans for further increases in the 
next few years. 35 The industry journal, Iron and Coal Trades Review, observed 
in March 1895 that the effect of the Admiralty program 
has been to enable private firms to tide over without disaster periods of 
depression that would otherwise have been extremely trying; and, natu-
rally, we have seen that the same policy has stimulated local and provin-
cial interest in naval affairs to a much greater extent than was formerly 
the case.36 
The use of naval procurement as countercyclical policy seems to have con-
tinued even after the end of the Great Depression in 1896. The beginning of the 
less severe depression of 1900-1904 was followed by another sharp increase in 
the naval budget in 1901, and even the decision in 1904 to build the Dread-
nought can be interpreted as another example of Keynesianism before Keynes. 
•• Hobsbawm,IndustryandEmpire, p. 107. 
•• Rostow, The World Economy, p. 381. 
•• Data on the naval budgets of Britain and other European powers are given in Kendall D. 
Moll, The Influence of History Upon Seapower, 1865-1914 (Menlo Park, California: Stanford 
Research Institute, 1969). 
•• Quoted in Arthur J. Marder, The Anatomy of British Sea Power: A History of British Naval 
Policy in the Pre-Dreadnought Era, 1880-1905 (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1940), p. 36. 
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Thus it was that by the beginning of the twentieth century, Britain had 
abandoned its industrial vocation for an imperial one. In 1851, "the workshop 
of the world" had dazzled Europe with the first industrial world's fair, The 
Great Exhibition at the Crystal Palace. Fifty years later, the scene was just as 
splendid but rather different: 
Never were instruments of war so gleaming with brass, so brilliant of 
paintwork, so stately with ensigns and bugle-calls and white canvas. The 
fleet which, in 1901, King Edward VII reviewed at Spithead at the close of 
the Victorian era offered perhaps the most gorgeous spectacle of power 
Europe has ever seen: the ships were painted in black, white and yellow, 
and fluttered all over with signal flags and pennants, and from their top-
masts flew gigantic White Ensigns and crosses of St. George, and their 
crews jauntily linked the decks, and their officers majestically saluted 
from their high bridges, and through the line of warships came the King 
of England in his royal yacht, the largest steam yacht in the world-
standard at the mainmast, duty officers at attention on the foredeck, a 
wispy stream of smoke from two bright yellow funnels, and beneath the 
cheers of the assembled crews and the successive melodies of the battle-
ship bands, the soft greased thump of reciprocating engines from impec-
cable engine-rooms below. 37 
The British steel industry now faced vigorous competition in its colonial 
and even home markets from the more efficient German and American steel 
industries. The emerging British electrical and chemical industries, 
underdeveloped because of the foreign orientation of the British financial 
system, also faced vigorous competition from their more efficient German and 
American counterparts, nourished and guided by investment and industrial 
banks. More broadly, the small island-state serving as the head of a far-flung, 
loosely-knit, sea-borne empire faced vigorous strategic competition from Ger-
many and America as two great continential powers. The liberal vision of free 
trade and free capital movements in a world arena was nearing exhaustion, or 
at least bringing about the industrial and strategic exhaustion of Britain while 
preserving the prosperity of the City of London. 
For a brief moment, British heavy industry put forward an alternative 
vision of the British future. It did so under the leadership of Joseph Chamber-
lain, a leader of the Conservative Party and a former mayor of Birmingham, 
the center of the British steel industry. 38 Chamberlain and his supporters pro-
posed that Britain erect tariff walls around much of its empire and that the 
dominions be compensated with greater participation in political decision 
making in London-imperial preference and imperial federation. The result 
37 James Morris, "A View of the Royal Navy," Encounter XL (March 1973): 20. 
38 Bernard Semmel, Imperialism and Social Reform: English Social-Imperial Thought 
1895-1914 (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1960). 
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would be a British world power with industrial and strategic strength equal to 
or greater than that of Germany and America. And together these three great 
"Saxon" powers would essentially divide much of the world into three spheres 
of influence and would no longer pursue conflicts of interest between 
themselves. 
The defeat of British heavy industry and of Chamberlain's vision, 
finalized in the Liberal electoral victory of 1906, was probably over-deter-
mined. A key role in the new imperial order would have been played by 
Canada. But many Canadian economic interests wanted access to cheap 
American capital-goods, and by this time there were some Canadian 
industrialists who wanted their own tariff walls against all foreign goods, 
including British ones. But the decisive attack on the industrial and imperial 
vision came from within Britain itself and was organized by the banks of the 
City of London which wanted to maintain the benefits from being the center 
of a system of free movement of goods and capital with the world as its arena. 
The banks were supported by many within its old ally, the textile industry, who 
still believed they could compete in cotton textiles. The long hegemony of the 
banking system in British politics meant that this particular tale of two cities, 
of London and Birmingham, would not have a surprise ending. 
The British steel industry was not strong enough, then, to displace the 
liberal vision and to impose its own. It was strong enough, however, to exact 
compensation in the form of renewed naval procurement and to justify the 
grand new battleships by pointing to the German menace in the years down to 
1914. 
Other nations also turned to vigorous state action during the Great 
Depression of 1873-1896 and later, in order to maintain their steel industries 
and the returns to capital in them. 
France 
Like its British counterpart, the French steel industry also was afflicted by 
the Great Depression of 1873-1876. The first response was, as we have already 
suggested, the state-supported expansion of the French railroad network 
under the Freycinet Plan of 1878. A second response was similar to that of 
Britain, a search for overseas markets. Jules Ferry, who had long represented 
the iron and steel industry of Eastern France, initiated an annexationist 
colonial policy when he was Premier in 1881. But this colonial policy was 
somewhat premature and was only fitfully pursued in the 1880s, when the ma-
jor thrust of state policy was the completion of the railroad network. 
What happened after the French railroads were built? The depression of 
1892. One response to this new downturn was the famous Meline Tariff of that 
year, the first high French customs barrier since before 1860. Another 
response was a reinvigorated colonial policy which lasted until the eve of 
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World War I. But the most substantial response was to build and finance rail-
roads in Russia with French equipment and capital and to buttress this grand 
railroad undertaking with the Franco-Russian Alliance of 1894. 39 
Germany 
The German steel industry and its associated industrial banks also were 
afflicted by the Great Depression. But the actions of the German state not only 
combined the various measures of the British and the French but included 
some innovative measures of its own. 
The first response was a minimal move, the tariff of 1879. This tariff was 
a central component of the coalition between German industrialists and 
Junker agrarians, "the marriage between iron and rye," and 1879 has been 
called the Second Founding of the Second Empire. In the same year, the 
Anti-Socialist Law was enacted. And at about the same time, the state under-
took the legal enforcement of cartel agreements to limit production and main-
tain prices. 40 
Yet tariff and cartel protection alone could not prevent the saturation of 
the steel industry's German markets, and Germany also experienced the 
depression of 1883. Germany then turned rather tentatively to what had been 
the first response of Britain, a search for overseas markets. Bismarck initiated 
a colonial policy in 1884, one which was not vigorously sustained. Bismarck 
also initiated a 20 percent increase in the German naval budget in the same 
year. The return of depression in 1890 was followed by a 60 percent increase in 
the German naval budget of 1891. The Germans, like the British before them, 
anticipated Keynes. The depressions of 1901 and 1908 were also followed 
quickly by unusual increases in the German naval budget. 41 At the same time, 
diplomatic efforts promoted foreign railroads, especially the Baghdad Rail-
way, which were built with German steel and capital but which posed a threat 
to British economic and strategic interests. 
Thus, by the beginning of the twentieth century, the steel industries of 
both Britain and Germany were focused on the building of warships, and the 
Anglo-German naval race was on. As the years went on, the naval race took 
on a reciprocal dynamic of its own. But it is interesting to note that most major 
jumps in the British and the German naval budgets occurred in a year or two 
after a downturn in the business cycle. 
•• Cameron, op. cit., and Fran~ois Caron, "French Railroad Investment, 1850-1914," in 
Essays in French Economic History, Rondo Cameron, editor (Homewood, Illinois: Richard D. 
Irwin, 1970), pp. 315-340. 
40 On this coalition between industrialists and Junkers, see Alexander Gerschenkron, Bread and 
Democracy in Germany (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1943); also V. R. Berghahn, 
Germany and the Approach of War in 1914 (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1973). 
•• Moll, op. cit., The classic analysis of the political economy of German naval procurement is 
Eckart Kehr, Battleship Building and Party Politics in Germany 1894-1901 (Chicago: University 
of Chicago Press, 1975). (Kehr's book was originally published in Germany in 1930.) Also see 
Berghahn, op. cit. 
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The Anglo-German naval race did not in itself lead to World War I. It 
did, however, place a barrier to any enduring Anglo-German detente, and it 
did lead to the Anglo-French naval entente of 1904. All of this, in turn, loaded 
the dice toward the particular form the alliance system took by 1914. 
One other German response to saturation in old industries was more in-
novative, however, and that was the creation of two new capital-goods in-
dustries, electricity and chemicals. The German industrial banks facilitated 
such industrial innovation. State measures also provided important support, 
especially the funding of technical and science education, the reform of 
municipal government to provide financial security for urban electric railroads 
and electric power systems, and, of course, military and naval procurement of 
explosives manufactured by the chemical industry. 42 
Italy 
The Italian steel industry was largely constructed in the 1900s. Even more 
than the preceding steel industries it was dependent upon state contracts and 
guarantees. Almost immediately, it became a major force for a vigorous 
foreign policy to achieve railroad concessions in the Balkans (especially, and 
rather pathetically, in Montenegro and Albania) and in the Ottoman Empire, 
and a force for a major buildup of the Italian navy. 43 Indeed, in the last years 
before World War I, there was something of a railroad war between Italy and 
Austria-Hungary in the Balkans. It was this rivalry which gradually separated 
Italy from its cooperation with Germany and Austria-Hungary in the Triple 
Alliance, and it was this search for new coloniaLterritories to the East which 
drove Italy into the War on the side of the Triple Entente of Britain, France, 
and Russia in 1915. 
The foreign export and military procurement phases recycled: 
from World War I to the Great Depression of 1929 
On the morrow of World War I, the steel industries of Europe and also of 
America, were again faced with the old problem: how to keep themselves in 
business, after the period of postwar reconstruction came to its inevitable end. 
There was a choice of several paths. 
Britain 
The British, in keeping with their practice of the minimal move, of 
muddling through, for the most part chose simply to do more of the same. 
They retained their overseas empire after the war, and thus they could con-
•2 W. 0. Henderson, The Rise of German Industrial Power, 1834-1914 (Berkeley: Univer~ity of 
California Press, 1975). 
43 R. A. Webster, Industrial Imperialism in Italy, 1908-1915 (Berkeley: University, of 
California Press, 1975). 
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tinue to build railroads to span their colonies, steamships to service them, and 
warships to defend them, i.e., they could continue in each of their three 
responses to the Great Depression of 1873-1896. In addition, however, they at 
last began the transition to a new leading sector. Having based much of their 
earlier industrialization. on textiles and having had high earnings from foreign 
trade and investment, the British had, more than other European countries, a 
consumer-oriented economy and high per capita income. Accordingly, they 
possessed in 1920 the second largest (after the Americans) automobile industry 
in the world, and this experienced a slow but steady growth during the 1920s. 
France 
The French recapitulated the British pattern, but in a reduced form. 
Before the war, their empire, their earnings from textile (especially woolen) ex-
ports, and their earnings from foreign investment had each been second only 
to Britain's. After the war, they too poured the output of their steel industry 
into more colonial railroads, steamships, and warships and also into a small 
automobile industry, which nevertheless was the third largest automobile in-
dustry in the world. 
Germany 
The Germans, having lost the war and having remained a country without 
a strong consumer goods sector, had in 1920 neither an overseas empire nor an 
automobile industry. For the German steel industry, consequently, there 
seemed to be only two feasible paths, and these were mutually reinforcing. 
One was renewed armaments production. The other was exports of steel 
products to markets in Eastern Europe and, relatedly, gaining control over the 
growing and competing steel industries of Austria, Czechoslovakia, and Po-
land. Throughout the 1920s, the steel industry supported those political parties 
which in turn supported rearmament, revision of the Treaty of Versailles, 
tariff barriers against Western Europe, and German domination of Eastern 
Europe. Its favorite political vehicle was the National People's Party, led by 
Alfred Hugenberg. 44 The steel industry was joined in its support by the Junker 
agrarians, making the National People's Party a renewal of the old marriage 
of iron and rye. The Junkers, imbued with military traditions and threatened 
by cheap grain imports from Poland, had their own reasons for rearmament, 
revision of Versailles, and domination of Eastern Europe. 
44 The politics of the German steel industry during the 1920s are discussed in Gerald D. 
Feldman, Iron and Steel in the German Inflation, 1916-1923 (Princeton: Princeton University 
Press, 1977); Charles S. Maier, Recasting Bourgeois Europe: Stabilization in France, Germany, 
and Italy in the Decade After World War I (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1975); and 
David Abraham, Inter-Class Conflict and the Formation of Ruling Class Consensus in Late 
Weimar Germany (Doctoral dissertation submitted to the Department of History, University of 
Chicago, December 1977). 
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By the 1920s, however, the German economic scene included two other 
leading sectors, the chemical industry and the electrical industry, and these had 
a very different political tendency. The German chemical industry was the 
second largest and the most advanced chemical industry in the world. (Its 
leading enterprise, I. G. Farben, was the world's largest chemical corporation 
and the largest corporation of any in Europe.)45 This meant that the chemical 
industry had a strong interest in free trade or at least in conditions which en-
couraged exports. The same was true of the German electrical industry which 
was the largest and the most advanced electrical industry in Europe. And since 
the largest and best markets for chemical and electrical products were other 
advanced industrial economies, these two industries were vitally interested in 
good relations with Western Europe. This led them to support those political 
parties which in turn supported "fulfillment" of the Versailles Treaty and the 
concluding of the Locarno Treaty of 1925 between Germany and its Western 
neighbors. Conversely, they were basically indifferent to Eastern Europe in the 
1920s (and there was never an "Eastern Locarno"). The favorite political 
vehicle of the chemical and industrial industries was the German People's 
Party, led by Gustav Stresemann. 46 
In addition to their interest in free trade, the chemical and electrical in-
dustries also had an interest in promoting mass consumption and therefore in 
supporting social welfare and democratic politics. I. G. Farben, encouraged 
by the widespread consensus among experts in the 1920s that world petroleum 
supplies would soon be exhausted, diverted most of its new capital investments 
into building enormous plants to produce gasoline from coal by a process 
known as hydrogenation. 47 It thus acquired a strong interest in the develop-
ment of a large German automobile industry. Similarly, the German electrical 
industry, a producer of consumer durables and municipal electrical equip-
ment, also had a strong interest in social welfare and municipal services. These 
features led the industries into supporting parliamentary coalitions which in-
cluded the Social Democratic Party. In brief, then, the Weimar Republic, with 
its foreign policy of "fulfillment" and its domestic policy of social welfare, 
was in many ways based upon a coalition of chemistry, electricity, and labor in 
opposition to the coalition of iron and rye. 48 
The Weimar system was in an unstable equilibrium, however. Its major 
leader, Stresemann, died in October 1929. At the same time, the New York 
stock market crash marked the beginning of a new Great Depression. The 
American responses to the economic crisis had momentous consequences for 
45 On I. G. Farben, see Frank A. Howard, Buna Rubber: The Birth of an Industry (New York: 
D. Van Nostrand, 1947); and Joseph Borkin, The Crime and Punishment of I. G. Farben (New 
York: The Free Press, 1978), an informative and perceptive industrial history, which goes beyond 
the connotations of its title. 
46 The politics of the German chemical and electrical industries during the 1920s are discussed by 
Maier, op. cit., and Abraham, op. cit. 
47 Howard, op. cit.; Borkin, op. cit., chapter 2. 
48 Abraham, op. cit., presents a thorough and sophisticated demonstration of this argument. 
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Germany. The Smoot-Hawley Tariff of 1930 led to the raising of tariff bar-
riers in other countries, dealing a serious blow to the free trade policies of the 
German chemical and electrical industries. In addition, the drying up of 
American loans to Germany broke a crucial link in the international economic 
chain which had lifted up German prosperity in the 1920s (American loans to 
Germany - German reparations to Britain and France - British and French 
imports from Germany). These two developments meant that the free trade 
option, the Westpolitik, of the chemical and electrical industries suddenly 
became far less viable. And they meant in turn that the coercive trade option, 
the Ostpolitik, of the steel industry suddenly became most attractive. Finally, 
the depression-induced sharp drop in world oil prices in 1930-1931 and the 
opening up of the vast East Texas oil field in 1931 meant that I. G. Farben, 
with its enormous investments in hydrogenation plants, was suddenly threat-
ened by massive imports of cheap American oil, much as the Junker agrarians 
had suddenly been threatened by massive imports of cheap American grain 
sixty years before. For I. G. Farben, the only solution to the Texan problem 
was a German government which would be strong enough and willing enough 
to guarantee a market for its coal-based gasoline, by erecting tariff barriers, 
by granting subsidies, by buying the gasoline itself, and by legitimating the 
vast expenditures entailed with an ideology of economic autarky and military 
preparedness-Le., the same ideology promoted by the steel industry and the 
grain producers. 49 
Together, these new developments in the world market propelled the 
chemical and electrical industries during 1932 from political opposition into 
political cooperation with the steel industry and the grain producers. And as 
the National People's Party under Hugenberg proved insufficiently popular to 
win the several elections of 1932, first the steel industry and then the chemical 
and electrical industries shifted their financial support to the National Socialist 
Party under Hitler. 50 With the coming to power of the Nazis in 1933, the 
foreign policy of the steel industry-rearmament, revision of Versailles, high 
tariffs, and domination of Eastern Europe-became the foreign policy of the 
new Germany. 
Italy 
The German experience had had an earlier and a simpler trial run in Italy. 
Of all the European steel industries before World War I, the Italian had been 
the most dependent upon armaments contracts. It was, therefore, unusually 
vulnerable to a period of peace, especially one in which the peace treaties, like 
49 Borkin, op. cit., chapter 3. 
•o Abraham, op. cit.; Borkin, op. cit., chapter 3. On the industrial role in the 1932 elections, 
also see Alan Bullock, Hitler: A Study in Tyranny, revised edition (New York: Harper and Row, 
1964). An earlier, classic account of the relations between industry and the Nazis is Franz Neu-
mann, Behemoth: The Structure and Process of National Socialism (New York: Oxford University 
Press, 1942). 
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Versailles, gave Italy no substantial territories on which new railroads could be 
laid. The inevitable postwar economic depression hit Italy in 1921 especially 
hard. Accordingly, the steel industrialists supported popular movements 
demanding revision of "the mutilated peace" and the annexation of new ter-
ritories. The major such movement, the Fascists, achieved power in 1922. 51 
But Italy's efforts at territorial expansion would have to wait for more than a 
decade until the new Great Depression produced a diplomatic constellation of 
the greater powers which was more favorable to Italian aims. 
We have seen the range of the different countries' responses. Given the 
historical British response to the combination of the Great Depression of 
1873-1896 and the German naval buildup of the 1890s, one might have 
thought that the British response to the new Great Depression and the German 
rearmament of the 1930s would have been similar, i.e., British rearmament. 
But, of course, this was not the case. Instead, the actual British response was 
rather like Joseph Chamberlain's program of the early 1900s, i.e., imperial 
preference and appeasement of the Germans. 
Part of the explanation lies ironically in the continuing hegemony of the 
British system of commercial banks operating in a world arena, of the same 
City of London that had defeated the Chamberlain program thirty years 
before. In "the terrible year" of 1931, there were massive runs on the pound 
and on the British commercial banks, and the government installed emergency 
capital controls. But the City of London needed to return as soon as possible 
to free movements of capital. The lesson that had been learned in 1931 was 
that the pound was now vulnerable in the face of even slight economic and 
political disturbances. A small sign of inflation or a small decline in the 
balance of trade could lead to a new run on the pound and a new financial col-
lapse. 
In domestic affairs, this meant that Britain could not increase con-
sumer-demand to the point that the wages of skilled labor were bid up, 
resulting in inflation, or that more raw materials were imported, resulting in a 
decline in the balance of trade. Thus Britain went through the 1930s with the 
government making no serious efforts at eliminating unemployment through 
Keynesian measures promoting mass consumption. 52 In colonial affairs, the 
extreme sensitivity toward the balance of trade meant that orderly, predictable 
markets for British exports were now highly valued. Thus, the City of London 
was now willing to accept imperial preference, formalized in the Ottawa 
Agreements of 1932. 
In foreign affairs, the consequences were even more moment9us. Just as 
the wage or raw-material dynamic could be detonated by government-induced 
consumer spending, so could it be detonated by government-ordered defense 
spending, i.e., rearmament. The City of London, haunted by the ghost of 
51 Roland Sarti, Fascism and the Industrial Leadership in Italy, 1919-1940 (Berkeley: University 
of California Press, 1971). 
• 2 Donald Winch, Economics and Politics: A Historical Study (London: Hodder and 
Stoughton, 1%9). 
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1931, imposed a low ceiling upon rearmament efforts and thus a narrow scope 
upon British foreign policy. In every diplomatic confrontation with Nazi Ger-
many and Fascist Italy in the 1930s, British foreign policy was severely con-
strained by the immediate need to prevent a foreign exchange crisis and by the 
military weakness resulting from minimal rearmament efforts. When Neville 
Chamberlain, the son of Joseph Chamberlain, moved from being Chancellor 
of the Exchequer to being Prime Minister in 1937, he was determined to accept 
these financial realities and to act accordingly in a coherent and systematic 
way. The result was his foreign policy of Appeasement. 53 
These, then, were the various responses of the different European nations 
to the continuing problems of saturation in their steel industries in the years 
following World War I. There was, however, yet another possible response, 
and that was to develop fully a massive new leading sector, in particular the 
automobile industry, and to pour steel into it. And this was the path taken by 
the United States. 
The political tendency of the automobile industry 
The domestic growth phase 
The impact of an automobile industry upon an economy is so great that it 
is justifiable to see the creation of that industry as a new stage in the in-
dustrialization of a country. 
It was the Americans, who with an almost single-minded intensity, first 
took this path. On the eve of the innovation of the automobile, the United 
States already had developed the most consumer-oriented economy and the 
highest per capita income in the world. It also included a large class of pros-
perous, independent farmers, many exporting to European markets, who were 
separated by long distances from their market towns and from each other and 
who provided a perfect market for the automobile. It is not surprising, 
therefore, that even before World War I, the United States possessed the 
largest automobile industry in the world, both in terms of absolute numbers of 
cars produced and in terms of cars per capita (about one car per thirty-five 
persons in 1914). 54 
The "start-up costs" for automobile production were actually rather low, 
as long as a manufacturer was interested in producing only a few cars. Thus, 
manufacturers of bicycles and buggies could rather easily convert to 
automobiles. However, the advent of mass-production and assembly-line 
techniques meant that success would go to companies that could raise enor-
mous amounts of capital, either through their profits (Ford) or through out-
53 Robert Paul Shay, Jr., British Rearmament in the Thirties: Politics and Profits (Princeton: 
Princeton University Press, 1977). 
•• On the early developments of the automobile industry in the United States, see James J. 
Flink, The Car Culture (Cambridge, Massachusetts: The M.I. T. Press, 1975). 
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side financing. One of the heroic moments of American capitalism was the 
decision by the Du Ponts, who had accumulated massive profits producing 
munitions for World War I (and who were confronted with a massive collapse 
of their markets with the advent of peace), to finance a struggling automobile 
company, which in 1919 had little grand about it except its name-General 
Motors. By 1926, General Motors was the world's largest automobile com-
pany. 
The boom in the American automobile industry in the 1920s fueled the 
more general boom in the American economy, ''the New Era.'' As steel 
poured into automobiles (30 percent of American steel production went into 
automobiles by the mid-1920s), the steel industry was released from the need 
for armaments contracts. There was therefore no leading American industry 
with an interest in "foreign entanglements" or a "military-industrial com-
plex." The Washington Naval Conference of 1922, with its limitation on 
capital ships, registered this American shift from ships to cars, from the Great 
White Fleet to the black Model T, from manifest destiny to consumer 
sovereignty. The American automobile industry provided the motor behind 
the foreign policy of isolationism. 
By 1929, there was one automobile for every five persons in the United 
States and given the existing structure of the distribution of income, the 
domestic market seemed to have reached saturation. Production of 
automobiles in the United States reached a peak in the spring of 1929. The 
clear leveling off of this massive leading sector was a major factor in the New 
York stock market crash six months later and in the ensuing Great Depression 
in the United States. 55 
The foreign export phase and the foreign investment phase 
By analogy with the British pattern of 1873-1896, after the railroads were 
built, one would expect that one response of the American automobile in-
dustry to the saturation of its domestic market would have been to expand its 
foreign operations, that is, the foreign export and the foreign investment 
phases of the product cycle. And indeed some of this occurred. The export 
drive of American automobiles was aborted, however, by tariff walls raised by 
foreign countries in response to the record-high Smoot-Hawley Tariff, im-
posed by the United States in 1930 under pressure from the American textile, 
steel, and other older industries. In regard to foreign investment, Ford had 
begun manufacturing operations in Britain and Germany in the early 1920s; 
General Motors had begun manufacturing operations in Germany in 1929. By 
1936, of the cars produced in Germany, 40 percent were produced by GM's 
subsidiary, Opel (the largest automobile producer in Germany), and 10 percent 
•• Useful accounts of the causes of the Great Depression of 1929-1939 are given in Derek H. 
Aldcroft, From Versailles to Wall Street, 1919-1929 (Berkeley: University of California Press, 
1977); and Charles P. Kindleberger, The World in Depression, 1929-1939 (Berkeley: University of 
California Press, 1973). 
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were produced by Ford. But the real era of direct foreign investment by the 
American automobile industry was to come only after World War II, a war 
which, among other things, made the world safe for consumer sovereignty. 
Europe did not really move into its "auto-industrial age"56 until after 
World War II. In 1935, Britain had only one automobile per twenty persons, 
France one per thirty-five, Germany one per hundred, and Italy one per 
two-hundred. In contrast the European countries would not reach the U.S. 
figure of one for every five people until the 1960s. 57 
How were the large amounts of capital for automobile industrialization 
mobilized in Europe after World War II? One method, analogous to the 
capital formation for steel and railroads in Britain, France, and Italy decades 
before, was through the export of manufactured products developed in an 
earlier stage, i.e., "export-led growth." Here, an important factor was not 
only the high quality of the products, but the low wages of European labor 
(relative to the United States) in the two decades after the end of the war. No 
authoritarian regime was required to repress wages in Europe. The low ex-
pectations of union membership, deriving from the privation of World War II, 
and the political divisions in union organization, deriving from the anti-com-
munism of the Cold War, were for many years the functional equivalent of 
wage-repression. The role performed in some Latin American countries by 
their own armies through authoritarian rule, according to the model of 
Guillermo O'Donnell, was performed in Europe by the ghost of the German 
Army and the spectre of the Russian Army. 
A second method, analogous to the earlier mobilization of capital for rail-
roads in Italy and Spain, was through the import of foreign funds. Until the 
mid-1950s, this involved U.S. government aid (i.e., the Marshall Plan), and 
from the mid-1950s until the mid-1970s it involved massive American direct 
investment in the European automobile industry. Even in the late 1940s, 
General Motors and Ford owned a large share of the European industry, and 
in the 1950s the American automobile industry entered into the foreign invest-
ment phase of its product cycle on a large scale. The American automobile cor-
porations first undertook large manufacturing investment in Britain, then 
West Germany, and then France. Normally, when a country of more than 
20 million people has reached a certain level of economic development 
(roughly $1,000 per capita GNP in 1965 dollars) it has developed a market in 
consumer durables which is large and prosperous enough to attract large-scale 
direct investment in manufacturing by the American automobile corporations. 
And since European labor was relatively self-restrained in its wage demands, 
the continued flow of American direct investment also did not require the 
labor-repressive policies of an authoritarian regime. Of course, 
•• The phrase is from Emma Rothschild, Paradise Lost: The Decline of the Auto-Industrial Age 
(New York: Random House, 1973). 
57 W. W. Rostow, Politics and the Stages of Growth (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
1971), pp. 227-229. 
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labor-repressive policies and authoritarian regimes did not inhibit the flow of 
foreign direct investment in Europe either, as was demonstrated by multi-
national automobile corporations when they undertook large manufacturing 
investments in Spain as that country rolled over the $1,000 threshold in the late 
1960s. 
Although the automobile industries of Britain, West Germany, France, 
and finally Spain were built up in part with American direct investment, the 
automobile industry in Italy was built up independently of it. The dominant 
automobile corporation in Italy, Fiat, had long differed from the other Euro-
pean automobile corporations in that it was a giant and profitable con-
glomerate which produced locomotives, aircraft, and other machinery, as well 
as automobiles. Other Italian automobile producers were owned or financed 
by the state. 
Britain, West Germany, France, and Italy finally entered "the auto-
industrial age'' in the 1950s. The automobile boom of the 1950s-1960s in these 
countries was at the core of their more general economic prosperity and 
growth at that time. As many political analysts have observed, this general 
economic prosperity and growth contributed to the legitimation of the Euro-
pean liberal-democratic systems, to the deradicalization of the European 
working class, and to the demarxification in the late 1950s of the programs of 
the British and West German Socialist parties, which had a large working class 
constituency. The particular features of the automobile boom further con-
tributed to the deradicalization of the European working class by inducing a 
shift from community activities to individual consumption. 
The growth of the automobile industry was especially rapid and pro-
nounced in the ex-Axis countries of Germany and Italy (and also Japan). Not 
surprisingly, the liberal domestic economic policies of these three countries in 
the 1950s and 1960s, the sort of policies natural to a confident capitalism 
engaged in a great boom, closely resembled the liberal domestic economic 
policies of the United States in the 1920s, the time of the first great boom in 
American automobile production. 58 In these countries, working class parties 
did not participate at all in the governments during the 1950s and 1960s, until 
in West Germany in 1966 recession brought the Socialists into a "Grand Coali-
tion" with the Christian Democrats. 
At the time that Europe underwent its postwar automobile boom, the 
United States also experienced a renewed expansion, a second wind, in its 
automobile industry, supported in part by the Keynesian fiscal policies of the 
Federal government, the Federal highway program, and the Federal home 
mortgage program which encouraged suburbanization. 
By the early 1970s, the ratio of cars to persons in Britain, France, West 
Germany, and Italy had reached about the American level of 1929, just before 
•• European economic policies in the 1950s and 1960s are discussed by Andrew Shonfield, 
Modern Capitalism: The Changing Balance of Public and Private Power (New York: Oxford 
University Press, 1969). 
This content downloaded from 
             130.58.34.24 on Fri, 06 Aug 2021 15:02:03 UTC               
All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms
30 International Organization 
the onset of the Great Depression of the 1930s. What happened after these 
European automobile industries reached the saturation points of their 
domestic markets? One result contributed to the economic recession and 
stagnation of 1974-1978. Of course the causes of the economic troubles of the 
last few years in Europe are many, but the saturation of the automobile 
market in Britain, France, West Germany, and Italy suggests that there is little 
basis for a sustained recovery unless, like the French, governments engage in 
what the Germans have called strukturpo/itik, that is, the conscious creation 
of new leading industrial sectors and the consequent recasting of the nation's 
industrial structure. A product-cycle theorist would predict that the Euro-
peans would adopt as their new ( or renewed) sectors those same industries 
which were the American new sectors a decade or a generation ago, i.e., aero-
space, computers, telecommunications, and nuclear power. And this would 
explain the intensity of the French export drive in aerospace and the French 
and German export drive in nuclear power since 1975. 
The automobile industries of Spain and Brazil (now ranking about 
seventh and eighth in size) have developed in a rather different way from those 
in the United States, Britain, France, West Germany, Italy, and Japan. First, 
in these six earlier automobile industrializers, at least one large automobile 
corporation was indigenous to the country; indeed, in the United States, Italy, 
and Japan, foreign corporations have accounted for almost none of the pro-
duction. In these earlier industrializers, the concept of the "national cham-
pion" against foreign competition has been plausible. In Spain and Brazil, in 
contrast, there has been no such large indigenous automobile corporation. All 
large producers are foreign multinationals or closely associated with them. 
Second, in Britain, France, and West Germany, the multinational 
presence has been largely American; in Spain and Brazil, it has been multi-
national, including various European and Japanese corporations. In the 
1960s, corporations such as Leyland, Renault, Volkswagen, Fiat, and Toyota 
entered into the direct foreign investment phase of their own product cycles. 
Third, Spain and Brazil have been the first societies to undertake mass 
production and consumption of automobiles within an authoritarian political 
system. But the political consequences of coexistence between the auto-
industrial age and an authoritarian regime have been different in the two coun-
tries. 
In Spain, the multinational automobile corporations pushed the govern-
ments after Franco's death in 1975 toward the liberalization and even 
democratization of the political system. The major reason was that 
automobiles produced in Spain would be very competitive within the Euro-
pean Common Market if Spain were a member. Spain in the late 1970s could 
be as cost-effective in automobiles as Italy was in the early 1960s, because 
Spain today holds roughly the relative wage position that Italy held then. But 
the Common Market would not admit Spain into membership until, in the 
words of a resolution passed by each of its main institutions in 1975, "freedom 
This content downloaded from 
             130.58.34.24 on Fri, 06 Aug 2021 15:02:03 UTC               
All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms
The political consequences of the product cycle 31 
and democracy have been established in Spain.'' (Indeed, given the 
self-interest of French and Italian farmers, it may not admit Spain even now.) 
In Brazil, and in the absence of the special inducements provided by an in-
ternational organization which is both a common market and a democratic 
community, the political consequences of the multinational automobile cor-
porations have been in the opposite direction. In the last two years of the 
Goulart government of the early 1960s, foreign investment in Brazilian 
manufacturing declined sharply. Among the economic, bureaucratic, and 
technocratic elites of Brazil, it was a plausible argument that an authoritarian 
regime was a necessary condition for the renewed flow of foreign investment 
and a fortiori for the expanding flow which was necessary for the leap into the 
next stage of industrialization. And, in fact, in the years after the military coup 
of 1964, American and European investment did pour into Brazil; the output 
of the automobile industry doubled between 1964 and 1970 and doubled again 
between 1970 and 1974. However, the foreign investment in the Brazilian 
automobile industry was somewhat anomalous. Whereas the per capita GNP 
in other host countries for multinational automobile corporations had been 
above $1,000, the per capita GNP of Brazil in 1966 was only $340. This made 
for a rather thin automobile market, despite Brazil's large population. This 
"premature" foreign investment in the Brazilian automobile industry was 
clearly induced by the political stability, repression of labor unions, and low 
wages which were imposed by the authoritarian regime established after the 
military coup of 1964. 
Since Brazil had and continues to have a much lower per capita GNP than 
other large automobile producers, the greatly-increased consumption of 
automobiles in Brazil required a special form of income redistribution, that is, 
redistribution to the middle class from the lower classes. This has been ac-
complished through government measures which repressed working-class real 
wages, reduced welfare and public health programs, increased 
middle-class real salaries, and provided government credit for automobile 
purchases. 59 These policies, which were necessary for a premature auto-
industrial age, could be imposed far more easily by an authoritarian govern-
ment than by a liberal-democratic one. The calculations of the Brazilian 
regime were suggested in 1974 by its Finance Minister, Mario Henrique Sim-
sonsen: 
A transfer of income from the richest 20 percent to the poorest 80 percent 
probably would increase the demand for food, but diminish the demand 
for automobiles. The result of a sudden redistribution would be merely to 
generate inflation in the food-producing sector and excess capacity in the 
car industry. 60 
•• Edmar L. Bacha, "Issues and Evidence on Recent Brazilian Economic Growth" (Cambridge, 
Massachusetts: Harvard Institute for International Development, Development Discussion 
Papers, 1976). 
•• Quoted in Norman Gall, "The Rise of Brazil," Commentary 63 (Januar)' 1977): 49-50. 
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When the military sought to legitimize its rule, its principal argument was 
the success of Brazilian industrialization and the greatly-increased consump-
tion of consumer durables, especially automobiles. Of course, even without 
the multinational automobile industry, there probably would still have been a 
military coup in Brazil in 1964 and an authoritarian regime. But the stability of 
the authoritarian regime was probably due to the course of the automobile 
industry. 
A product-cycle theorist would also have a ready explanation for the U.S. 
foreign policy of detente with the Soviet Union during the Nixon and Ford Ad-
ministrations. It was just at the end of the 1960s that the American automobile 
corporations, which had recently invested heavily in Southern Europe and the 
more developed parts of Latin America, were searching for the area with the 
next highest level of economic development, which, of course, was Eastern 
Europe and the Soviet Union. The SALT I (1972) and Vladivostok (1974) arms 
agreements were skillfully designed so as to create simultaneously an at-
mosphere for detente (desired by the American automobile industry and by 
American international banks) and a ratification of increased production of 
strategic missiles (desired by the American aerospace industry, which in the 
late 1960s also entered into a period of economic decline). Thus Henry Kis-
singer accomplished his own Reinsurance Treaty with the Russians, as Bis-
marck had done in 1887; at the same time, Kissinger prevented the disruption 
of the established foreign policy consensus between autos and aerospace, his 
own "marriage between iron and rye.'' 
Kissinger's achievement was as brilliant as Bismarck's, but it was even 
more brief. By 1975, the American automobile industry had rediscovered that 
operations in communist countries usually entailed problems which out-
weighed the profits. And by 1977, American and European international 
banks had loaned some $50 billion to communist countries, and the banks had 
perceived that this was about the limit of the countries' capacity for orderly 
repayment. The American industrial and financial interests supporting detente 
were now much diminished. It is not surprising that the American political 
figures supporting detente were too. 
At about the same time, the great increase in the world price of oil, as a 
result of OPEC's actions in what has been called the "October Revolution" of 
1973, led Soviet authorities to reduce the growth of the Soviet automobile 
industry. The "auto-industrial age" of the Soviet Union remains on an 
ever-receding horizon, and the Soviet ideal remains what it has been since the 
October Revolution of 1917, a great monument to the leading sectors of the 
Europe of sixty years ago-steel, chemicals, electricity, and armaments. 
Conclusions 
It could be ~rgued that the long era during which leading industrial sectors 
had an impact upon political outcomes has come to its end. For by now the 
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advanced industrial nations are populated with many industrial sectors, and 
probably never again will one industry alone so dominate these countries as the 
textile, steel, and automobile industries each did in its time. But our review of 
the last two centuries also has noted times when political outcomes were 
shaped not by one sector but by conflicts and coalitions between several, for 
example, Britain in the 1900s and Germany in the 1920s. The political out-
comes of the next decade similarly may be shaped by conflicts between protec-
tionist industries (textiles, steel, recently chemicals) and free trade ones (aero-
space, computers, telecommunications), with a swing position being held by 
the automobile industry, whose interests are divided and conflicting. The long 
hegemony of the free trade coalition, dating from World War II, may be near-
ing an end as particular industries and corporations are driven by poor com-
petitiveness in the world market (by phase 4 of Vernon's product cycle), into 
the protectionist camp. One political consequence would be the eroding of the 
Atlantic Alliance and of its military organization, NATO, at the very time that 
the Soviet Union has carried out a large buildup of its military forces in 
Europe. As the 1890s and the 1930s suggest, a time of protectionist hegemony 
is unlikely to be an enlightened one. 
There is an alternative path and that would be for one country, most 
probably the United States, to undertake the development of new industrial 
sectors. Since a new American industry would be likely to create and to 
dominate for a time an international market for its product, it would be a 
powerful ally and reinforcement for the now dwindling free trade coalition. 
And the hegemony of free trade, of ''interdependence,'' might experience a 
renewal and second wind. 
What might be one such new industry in the United States? Here, we 
might find some clues in the past. Two of our earlier leading sectors, railroads 
and automobiles, plus another major industry, aerospace, were successive im-
provements in transportation. 61 But, as the history of the Concorde suggests, 
improvements in transportation may have reached the limits possible within 
the technological frameworks of the old industries. The next logical leap is to 
move not bodies but minds, i.e., to improve not transportation but com-
munication. This suggests that an obvious candidate for the next great leap 
forward is the telecommunications industry. It is an even more obvious candi-
date since the higher cost of petroleum has in part eroded the economic base of 
the automobile and aerospace industries. And indeed corporations such as 
IBM, ITT, and RCA are now poised to undertake a number of significant 
innovations in visual and computer telecommunications. For such innova-
• 1 I have discussed the American aerospace industry in a number of places, including my "Aero-
space Production Lines and American Defense Spending," in American Defense Policy, Richard 
G. Head and Ervin J. Rokke, editors, third edition (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 
1973), pp. 626-640; "Why We Buy the Weapons We Do," Foreign Policy 2 (Summer 1973): 
33-56; and statement and testimony on American defense production in Defense Industrial Base: 
DOD Procurement Practices, Hearings before the Joint Committee on Defense Production, 
Congress of the United States, 95th Congress (Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office, 
1977), pp. 63-90. 
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tions, the main barrier may well be not the lack of capital but the threat of 
government regulation, which would preserve the sunk investment of the old 
established corporation in the industry, A. T .&T. 62 
Will the 1980s see a great telecommunications boom fueling a general 
economic boom like the great railroad, automobile, and aerospace booms of 
the past? It is not easy to see the shape of such a development, just as it was 
not easy to see the shapes of the earlier developments on their eve. But a great 
telecommunications industrial sector would have implications for military 
power and international politics as well as for international trade. Today, the 
liberal democracies of the United States and Western Europe find themselves 
unable to mobilize the vast financial resources required to match the Soviet 
Union and its European allies tank-for-tank and plane-for-plane, and unwill-
ing to demoralize themselves through a total dependence upon nuclear 
weapons. But out of a massive telecommunications industry would issue the 
inventions and innovations for a new kind of weapons systems and military 
defense, of which existing "precision-guided munitions," "smart bombs," 
and "automated battlefields" are only premonitions. And these would be 
weapons systems in which the technologically-advanced liberal democracies of 
NA TO would have both an absolute and a comparative advantage. 63 And once 
again, innovation of new industrial sectors, "gales of creative destruction," 
would prove to be the basis, and perhaps the necessary condition, for the con-
servation of old and worthy political institutions. 
62 On the issue of innovation and regulation, see Competition in the Telecommunications 
Industry, Hearings before the Subcommittee on Communications of the Committee on Interstate 
and Foreign Commerce, House of Representatives, 94th Congress (Washington: U.S. 
Government Printing Office, 1977). 
63 On the implications of these new military technologies, see James Digby, Precision-Guided 
Weapons, Adelphi Papers, no. 118 (London: The International Institute for Strategic Studies, 
Summer 1975); and Richard Burt, New Weapons Technologies: Debate and Directions, Adelphi 
Papers, no. 126 (London: The International Institute for Strategic Studies, Summer 1976). 
